Foundation for Equality Before the Law

Now In The Past: Remember Church Street, Pretoria

By Jako Bezuidenhout 22 May 2020

Bombing in South Africa During The 1980’s Pretoria and Johannesburg

One of the most shocking incidents of terror in South African history occurred on 20 May 1983. A motor car loaded with powerful explosives was detonated at around four o’clock in the afternoon right in front of a Nedbank Square building. (Commonly known as Nedbank Square Maritime House). Altogether 19 people died, including 12 civilians and 7 members of the army. In total 219 people were either severely injured or maimed, of which 217 were civilians and 2 were army members. In his book “The Long Walk to Freedom”, Mr Mandela expressed his regret over the incident but, at the same time, stated that the ANC accepted that incidents of this nature would occur during the armed struggle.

Various members of the NEC were not in the country when these attacks were at their fiercest levels and, as such, escaped prosecution.

During 1996, Col de Kock was found guilty in the Supreme Court in Pretoria and was sentenced to life plus 80 years imprisonment for the five murders that took place at Nelspruit. In total he received two life sentences plus 212 years imprisonment on six other counts of murder (including that of Japie Maponya), various counts of attempted murder and other charges.

With the exception of the murders that took place at Nelspruit, the various amnesty committees found that all the other incidents were committed with a political objective and were, in fact, connected to the conflict of the past. He was refused amnesty on two of these counts as it was felt he had not made a full disclosure. Application for a revision of these cases would unquestionably have succeeded. However, even Adv Hattingh, who appeared on behalf of Col de Kock in all of his amnesty hearings, conceded that there was no possibility of a successful revision in the Nelspruit case. It would therefore not have benefited him to apply for a revision.

Sometimes the impression is created that Eugene de Kock is in a fix while the generals are scot-free – but this stems from ignorance of the facts. In the Nelspruit case, Col de Kock tried to implicate General Krappies Engelberecht but, during the criminal and amnesty hearings, conclusive evidence was presented to the effect that his assertions were unfounded.

In the Rapport of 10 January 2010, Jacques Pauw insisted, inter alia, that Gen Engelbrecht be brought to trial. It is not clear whether this stems from malice or from an inability to grasp the evidence given during the criminal and amnesty hearings.

There isn’t a shred of evidence on which Gen Engelbrecht can be prosecuted and we challenge Mr Pauw to demonstrate on what grounds he believes Gen Engelbrecht could be charged.

There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the generals was implicated in any of the murders which Col de Kock was found guilty of. In the Maponya case General le Roux was still a colonel and was refused amnesty along with Col de Kock.

However, as Mr Malan ably demonstrated in his minority finding, amnesty was wrongly denied in the Maponya case. Mr Pauw and any of his like-minded colleagues can quite safely read Mr Malan’s finding and perhaps get someone with a legal background to explain it to them.

Apparently the principle of equality before the law had to give way before the harsh manner in which prosecution of former members of the Security Branch was insisted upon. As any advocate experienced in criminal law will confirm, on the basis of common purpose there exists, purely from what can be seen, damning evidence to prosecute all those members of the NEC who were not granted amnesty. It is striking, however, that no one seems to insist that equality before the law should be maintained.

Lately the possible pardoning of Col de Eugene de Kock has been severely criticised and persons, who presumably haven’t the vaguest idea what Afrikaner character is all about, loudly condemned the move on behalf of the Afrikaner. They have even less insight into the disgusting and objectionable conditions Col de Kock was exposed to during his career in the police.

On various occasions he was decorated with medals for gallantry. During the negotiation process the members of the Vlakplaas Unit became an embarrassment for Mr de Klerk and his cabinet who were more concerned about winning favour with the ANC at that stage. As a result they had to get rid of the unit. Members of the unit were treated like lepers and this undoubtedly caused much bitterness within their ranks.

While negotiations regarding amnesty were in progress and a general amnesty for all was being strongly considered, Judge Goldstone began to investigate cases against Col de Kock and other members of the Security Branch, which were associated with a political objective and committed in the conflict of the past. Gen Johan van der Merwe approached Mr de Klerk and objected to this and called for the investigation to be stopped – but. Mr de Klerk wouldn’t hear of it indicating that it would give the impression that he was trying to cover up the atrocities of the Security Branch.

Members of the South African Police were expressly forbidden by Mr de Klerk to investigate similar charges against members of the ANC. Had the principal of equality before the law been adhered to, and law and justice prevailed, the investigation of all such cases would have been put on hold until there was clarity surrounding the matter of amnesty. Had this been the case, Col de Kock would, without doubt, have received a lighter sentence because he could only have been prosecuted for the Nelspruit incident and on the theft charges. The judge would also have had the advantage of knowing material facts uncovered during the amnesty process, which would definitely have set the hearings in a different light.

In a letter to Rapport on 10 January 2010 Mr Koos van der Merwe, well known member of Parliament and one of the few remaining political leaders of the old dispensation who has the courage of his convictions and who has the backbone to state his case in public, said as follows:

NOW IN THE PAST: Remember Church Street, Pretoria

At 16h19 on 20 May 1983, Church Street (today known as Stanza Bopape Street) in Pretoria (today known as Tshwane) was bustling with life as employees of its buildings were getting ready to go home for the weekend. Also on the street was a white Colt Galant parked directly outside the South African Airforce (SAAF) Headquarters at Nedbank Square Maritime House. The car itself was ordinary enough, but its contents were extraordinary. Inside the Colt Galant was a powerful car bomb that was about to change the lives of those on Church Street that day. This week we commemorate one of the deadliest terror attacks on South African soil.

One day before, a 41 year-old Belgian citizen, Hélène Pastoors, entered South Africa from Swaziland with the white Colt Galant. She was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC). Her commander was Aboobaker Ismail, who instructed her to drive the car from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. The car had been stolen on 19 June 1982 in Edenvale in the then Transvaal Province. Placed inside the boot of the car was a massive 40 kilogram bomb that would be detonated by remote control. According to Pastoors’ court statement, she met “Commander Bai” (presumably Ismail) in the parking lot of the Raleigh Fitkin Memorial Hospital in Manzini, Swaziland where she took reception of the car, a radio to activate the bomb, as well an air ticket. “I don’t know where or how the actual bomb was hidden, but I inspected the car and it looked OK to me for transport.” She then got to the border where “inspecting soldiers (SA) saw the radio in my luggage but didn’t ask questions”. Pastoors took a rural road and replaced the licence plates, which would be changed again to Transvaal licence plates in Pretoria.

She describes the drop-off:

I reached Mamelodi station (outside Pretoria) around 6-7pm, locked and parked the car as agreed with keys left inside, made my way to Pretoria central station where I phoned to Bai in Swazi to confirm delivery… I then took a train to Johannesburg, stayed one night in a hotel and flew back with Air Swazi to Swaziland in the afternoon of May 20. I never knew what the exact target was until the news came through the media.

Meanwhile, Ezekiel Maseko and Freddie Shongwe took possession of the car. Maseko had been arrested years ago for housebreaking, theft and armed robbery and was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to imprisonment. It was disclosed later in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings that they had been recruited into MK by a man called John Mnisi and sent for training in Swaziland. Mnisi had also been arrested by the security police in 1981, but after his arrest, it was decided not to prosecute him due to the valuable information he had provided them. According to former commissioner of the South African Police, Johan van der Merwe, Mnisi had been “linked to the Vlakplaas unit as askari, where he was initially cooperating fully. His brother was also later arrested and used as askari, but the two later fled and re-joined the ANC”. Mnisi not only recruited Maseko and Shongwe, but he would also assist Ismail in placing the bomb and remote mechanism into the vehicle.

According to Maseko’s mother, her son called her early on 20 May and told her that he was on his way to their home in Mamelodi East from Swaziland. She said that Maseko and another man arrived later in a Colt Galant and proceeded to remove the engine number of the car with an angle grinder. Maseko also had with him a metal case containing R3 000 in cash which he left at the house. Maseko and Shongwe then left for Pretoria with the Colt Galant and Maseko’s Kombi. They then dropped the Kombi in the area and took the Colt Galant to Nedbank Square Maritime House.

It seems that the plan was that one of them would stay in the car to activate the receiver device while the other would ready the transmitter device in the Kombi. The idea was that the transmitter, once activated, would send out radio waves, to be picked up by the receiver device. The receiver would then cause detonation of the explosives. As soon as the receiver was activated, the one in the Colt Galant would get out and walk towards the Kombi which would be the getaway vehicle. Once in the Kombi, they would activate the transmitter, thereby detonating the bomb. The time of detonation was planned for 16h30 as it would be the end of the week and the street would be teeming with people, thus maximising on human casualties.

As it turned out, Shongwe remained in the car while Maseko walked back to the Kombi. At 16h20 Maseko returned and gave Shongwe the signal to activate the receiver. Shongwe took the mechanism and turned the switch.

At the same time 22 year-old Neville Clarence, a fighter controller instructor for the SAAF, was on his way from Waterkloof Air Force Base to the SAAF Headquarters to collect documentation for recruiting purposes. The SAAF Headquarters occupied the first, second and third floors of the 16-floor Nedbank Square Maritime House. The other thirteen floors were used by civilian companies.
On the ground floor was a café as well as other businesses. Clarence recalls: “We proceeded to Air Force Headquarters but didn’t allow enough time for the traffic on a Friday afternoon… At that time the Air Force use[d] to work until half past four, so by the time we arrived there were already people leaving the building.” Clarence found parking in the loading zone directly in front of the building. “I
was still trying to decide whether it was now worthwhile to go up into the building to go and fetch the documentation I wanted or whether to proceed on our way” when he heard what sounded like a click sound…”

Suddenly, there was a tremendous explosion. The blast ripped through Nedbank Square Maritime House. Andre Mostert had walked out of the Poynton Building and was just about to walk into Church Street to fetch a vehicle but “before I got into the area I heard a huge blast. It was by pure luck that I was not involved”. The 19 year-old Lydia van der Merwe had just finished work for the
week at her office near the Bosman-Church streets intersection and was sitting on the bus to take her home when she felt and heard the “loudest explosion of her life”. She immediately got off the bus and ran in the direction of the sound: “[A]nd when I turned in Church I was met by a sight so horrific it couldn’t have been real”. The windows of high-rise buildings on either side of the street
were blown out and “so many people along the street that each glass shrapnel hit a body and drew blood”. She recalls the sight of blood everywhere and the confusion of the moment, mixed with the “sounds of wailing, injured people”.

Meanwhile, Clarence was trapped in his car and had sustained shrapnel and glass injuries to his face which resulted as well as damage to his eardrums: “A few seconds later I felt myself being pulled out of the car and I was laid down on a pavement and at that stage I couldn’t see.” He would later find out that he would be blind for life. However, Clarence was, in many respects, extremely lucky. He had inadvertently parked “about a meter” behind the Colt Galant, but his car managed to absorb most of the blast, thereby sparing his life. However, not everyone was that ‘lucky’.

Directly outside the entrance to the building was a bus stop where many people, white and black, were waiting to get picked up. This bus stop was completely destroyed and many people were killed here instantly. Extensive damage was also done to the SAAF Headquarters and surrounding offices and buildings. To many eyewitnesses, the scene resembled a warzone. Meanwhile, Colonel Basie Smit and Major Suiker Britz of the Central Investigation Division were at Club 34, not far from the scene. They rushed to Church Street where they were met with death and destruction. There were corpses, severely injured or maimed people, limbs, bones and bloodstained clothing scattered everywhere. In front of the building Col. Smit and Maj. Britz saw the wreckage of a car with human remains, believed to be the origin of the explosion.

Soon the Forensic Science Laboratory under General Lothar Neethling carefully surveyed the scene to locate crucial evidence. The authorities were uncertain whether this was the start of a series of coordinated bomb attacks across the city, so the investigation needed to be speedy. The engineering division of the Quartermaster examined the car wreckage and explosives experts combed the scene to determine the type of explosives used and how much explosives were used. The Forensic Science Laboratory later determined which limbs belonged to whom by doing blood and tissue tests. Soon after arrival Maj. Britz noticed one of the corpses lying close to the wreckage of the Colt Galant. The corpse was partially burned but Maj. Britz thought the face looked familiar. When he got home, he consulted his files and photographs of people whom he had arrested. Sure enough, the corpse belonged to Ezekiel Maseko. Freddie Shongwe was the corpse in the wreckage. After a quick but thorough investigation, which involved talking to both Maseko’s and Shongwe’s mothers as well as a forensic analysis of the iron filings found at Maseko’s home, the police confirmed the identities if the perpetrators.

The investigation would also lead police to the location of the Kombi. Inside it they found the transmitter to activate the receiver of the explosives. Remnants of the receiver were also found in the wreckage of the Colt Galant. The police concluded that both men must have been confused with the order in which both devices needed to be activated. The transmitter in the Kombi was activated
first, instead of the receiver. The signal from the transmitter was already live, so when Shongwe switched on the receiver, the signal was received immediately which resulted in instant detonation. Both men died instantly.

Initially 16 other people were believed to be killed by the bomb, 6 of them were SAAF personnel. However, one SAAF member, Airman Wayne Lawrence Kirtley (19) was still missing. After an intensive search of the area, authorities discovered his body the next day. The violent force of the blast had hurled Airman Kirtley’s body across the street where it hit a lamp post before landing on the balcony of a residential flat. In the end, 19 people – including the perpetrators – were killed. Ten of the victims were civilians, of which 7 were black people who were waiting at the bus stop. A total of 217 people were injured, with many of them losing limbs due to the injuries sustained by the blast.

In her statement, Pastoors noted that “three senior comrades discussed this action” with her once she arrived in Mozambique. The three were: “Commander Bai (presumably Ismail), Comrade (Joe) Slovo and Comrade President Oliver Tambo”. She recalled that none of them were ‘jubilant’ over the action. To the contrary, they “all stated that it was very hard to have to use these kinds of weapons, but it was necessary for the struggle”. About her own involvement in the operation Pastoors said: “[I]t was difficult to come to terms with it emotionally, but I accept it was necessary and don’t question the judgement of the leadership in this regard.”

It took a while for Tambo to claim ANC responsibility for the attacks. In fact, only after a retaliatory bombing raid by SAAF jets on ANC facilities in Maputo three days later, did he announce that MK had planned and organised the Church Street attack and that he had authorised it. During his application for amnesty at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings held 13 years later, Ismail submitted that Tambo gave authorisation for his Special Operations Command unit to orchestrate and execute an attack following the assassination of anti-apartheid activist and Slovo’s wife, Ruth First on 17 August 1982, as well as an assault in December 1982 by South African security forces on fifteen ANC targets in Maseru, resulting in the deaths of 42 people, with at least 7 being women and children. According to Ismail, Tambo “had raised the issue that if the then government justified its action on the basis that civilians were killed because the ANC had set up bases amongst the civilian population, then would it also not be justified for the ANC to carry out operations against enemy headquarters and bases located within built-up areas?” The TRC was told by Ismail that the Special Operations Command accepted that the Church Street bombing, though primarily aimed at “military personnel” gathered at the bus stop, would “also result in civilian casualties”.

Bizarrely, the TRC described the attack which claimed killed and maimed more civilians than “military personnel” as follows:

The blast was an act of war which struck a severe blow at the ANC’s enemy and which introduced a new phase of guerrilla warfare in the struggle. Although the consequences of the blast were gruesome and tragic and affected many innocent civilians we, after
careful consideration, are of the view that the manner of the execution of the operation was not disproportionate to the political objectives pursued.

It must be noted here that the Church Street attack occurred two years before the ANC and South African Communist Party’s (SACP) Kabwe Conference in Zambia in June 1985, where it was decided that civilian casualties could no longer be avoided when planning military operations. Thus, the “new phase of guerrilla warfare” should have actually started in 1985 and not 1983.

The TRC conceded that the bombing took place before the Kabwe Conference but stated that this did not mean “that the target selection was against ANC policy. It was always the policy of MK to target security force personnel and, with regard to the civilian casualties, the operation was given prior approval by the highest authority in the ANC”. The reputable historian, Leopold Scholtz, argues that the armed struggle up until 1983 testified “to a moral unwillingness to shed blood. But the South African attack on ANC targets in Matola, Maputo in 1981, caused a mindshift, and Oliver Tambo promised vengeance”. This would explain why the attack happened long before an official decision was made by ANC and SACP leadership to not take civilian casualties into consideration. It seems that the motive for the attack was pure vengeance. Yet, the TRC attributed it as a “political objective” to conduct “a highly visible attack against military personnel which could not be covered up…”

In addition the TRC described the Church Street attack as “guerrilla warfare”. But what is guerrilla warfare? According to the Oxford Dictionary it is the “engagement in or the activities involved in a war fought by small groups of irregular soldiers against typically larger regular forces”. In other words, it is irregular warfare in which small groups of combatants use military tactics including
sabotage, ambushes, raids, hit-and-run-tactics as well as mobility to fight and disrupt a larger and less-mobile traditional military.

In contrast, ‘terrorism’ is defined as: “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians in the pursuit of political aims.” Of course, there are many variants to this definition that go further and describe terrorism as the coercion or intimidation of government or societies in the pursuit of not only political goals but could also include religious or ideological goals. A state can also be guilty of terrorism if it coerces or intimidates its citizens with unjustified violence. Indeed, the apartheid state constantly used violence to suppress opposition to its policies, with the Maseru raid and the assassination of Ruth First being prime examples. The common denominator in all of these definitions is the use of unlawful violence to achieve a political goal. It seems that in this instance, the TRC panel had mistaken terrorism for guerrilla warfare.

Be that as it may, if this was an “act of war” as the ANC and TRC claims it was, it transgresses the internationally recognised Geneva Conventions and protocols of 1949 which apply at times of war and armed conflict. Common Article 3 applies to armed conflicts that are contained within the boundaries of a single country. It provides limited protection to persons taking no active part in hostilities, in other words, civilians. Also included in this category are “military persons who have ceased to be active as a result of sickness, injury or detention”. According to this Article, civilians should not be targeted in pursuit of a military objective.

At their own admission, the ANC leadership knew that civilian casualties would be a probability. But this probability was nullified by their desire to send a violent message to the South African government: the ANC was prepared to inflict civilian casualties in their fight against the apartheid authoritarian state. This message was loud and clear. But what is that, if not terrorism? Even if it was
for a noble cause, killing unarmed civilians in a bomb blast in pursuit of a political objective is coldblooded murder, just like indiscriminately killing women and children in the process of taking out ANC cadres during a military raid. In fact, in law it is the worst possible form of intent, namely dolus indeterminatus because it is the intention to murder without caring who the victims may be (whether they are men, women, the elderly or children), or how many victims there will be. Terrorism is terrorism, no matter who perpetrates it.

However, the TRC felt that those who were involved in the attack and had applied for amnesty should receive it. In total, three people, including Ismail and Pastoors applied for amnesty for the Church Street bombing. All three were granted amnesty. Oliver Tambo and Joe Slovo both died before the TRC hearings started and both perpetrators died in the blast. However, it is not farfetched to think that members of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) or top MK commanders in 1983 ought to have known about the planning and execution of the attack. Some of these members, such as Thabo Mbeki, Mac Maharaj and Jacob Zuma are still alive today. None of them applied for amnesty at the TRC.

In contrast, many apartheid-era security policemen were refused amnesty for their roles in the deaths of hundreds of anti-apartheid activists. Even though he never applied for amnesty, General Magnus Malan was prosecuted for the role he played as Minister of Defence for the deaths of 13 people, including 7 children, at KwaMakhutha in 1987, though eventually he was acquitted. Adriaan
Vlok, former Minister of Law and Order, did apply for and received amnesty for his part in various atrocities, but he was prosecuted for a ‘lesser’ crime of attempted murder, along with former South African Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe. However, a plea bargain with the state saved them from lengthy jail sentences. Then there is also Janusz Walus, convicted assassin of MK chief of staff and general secretary of the SACP, Chris Hani. When Walus and fellow convicted murderer, Clive Derby-Lewis applied for amnesty, the TRC refused. Indeed, the murder of Chris Hani almost precipitated a civil war, which was the intention of Walus and Derby-Lewis all along. That fact makes the crime even more of an abomination. However, what was the Church Street attack if not a crime against humanity? Many people were killed and over 200 injured in this single attack, yet those responsible went on with their lives unpunished. Is the value of one life equal to the lives of many, depending on whom that one life belongs to? The TRC seemed to think that it did. Undoubtedly, the TRC’s intentions were for the most part good, but there has been a lot of criticism levelled against its effectivity from all sides based on these kinds of inconsistencies.

Unfortunately, this has also allowed far right-wing groups to push their own political agendas, while using the Church Street attack as an emotive issue. On 20 May 2015, members of the right-wing group Front Nasionaal as well as AfriForum Youth gathered at the scene in Church Street to commemorate the bombing. Front Nasionaal leader, Willie Cloete said that the day was important because of its impact on South African history: “Innocent people were killed by a bomb that shouldn’t have been planted in the first place.” Cloete vowed that his group would continue to commemorate this day. Assistant General Manager of Transvaal Agricultural Union of South Africa (TAU SA), Henk van de Graaf added that the bombing was “the beginning of a terrorist war that was continuing today in the form of farm murders”. A year later, Wessel Basson of the National Conservative Party led the speakers in front of a mixed crowd of survivors and party members. According to the Pretoria East Rekord Basson also placed a small white coffin that held six flags nex tto the spot where the bomb went off. A granite plaque with the names of the 17 victims was also unveiled before Basson added: “If the city ever removes the stone, it will be like they are killing all those people again.” Even right-wing entertainers such as Sunette Bridges and Steve Hofmeyer led those commemorating the attack in singing Die Stem van Suid-Afrika.

The problem with these kinds of groups is that they hijack the commemoration process and reignite anger and hatred in an attempt to score cheap political points instead of allowing the survivors and families of the victims to grieve and remember them. By feeding off this anger and hatred, these political groups are not much better than the ANC leadership who knew and sanctioned the attack.
The difference is that these groups do not use a physical bomb. Instead, they attempt to detonate an ideological bomb into the consciousness of those easily influenced by that kind of rhetoric.

Unfortunately, for the survivors and the victims’ families no one else seems to care nowadays. It seems as if they have become an inconvenient truth that counters the ANC liberation narrative. In fact, the very street in which the bombing took place has recently had its name changed. It seems odd that for a relatively neutral name such as “Church Street”, the government felt the need to
rename it after a couple of struggle heroes. For many of the families and survivors, they feel as if their suffering is second-rate. All they want is for the ANC to issue an apology so that their trauma and sacrifice can be officially recognised for what it was. For Lydia van der Merwe no care had been given for the psychological well-being of people like her: “A public apology would make such a
difference.” But this is yet to be given.

The Church Street bombing is one of the worst terror attacks in South Africa. To hide from that fact is to ignore and dishonour its victims. Apartheid was a truly evil system of oppression that disfigured every facet of society in South Africa. That should also never be forgotten. But at the same time, it should also be remembered that it was not the only evil. In fighting the system, liberation movements were often guilty of heinous crimes themselves. Therefore, it must be remembered that the constitutional democracy we enjoy today, is thanks to all those who sacrificed their lives during the “armed struggle”, not only those who the ANC wish to remember. But to remember the attack today as a country is not to condemn or to condone the act. Rather, it is to acknowledge how we have progressed as a country since that terrible day in May 1983. That is the greatest tribute we can pay to those victims and it is the greatest lesson we can learn from them.

Acknowledgments: Special thanks to Sieg Minnie and Brigadier (Retired) Hennie Heymans for their advice and interest.

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